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13. Public administration, civil servants and implementation 
By Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen  
Chapter 13 in Miles, Lee and Wivel, Anders (eds.) (2013), “Denmark and 
the European Union”, Routledge: 189-203.   
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines how the Danish public administration responds to the 
European Union (EU). First, it does so first on a more general account in the EU 
policy cycle, but narrows the focus down to concern the role played when EU policies 
are implemented. Secondly it examines implementation of EU obligations within two 
policy areas; healthcare and environment. For both areas, the administrative autonomy 
to implement has been considerable, but depends on the political, judicial and societal 
checks and balances that the executive encounters when transposing EU obligations 
into national acts and practices. Furthermore, the analysis substantiates that whereas 
Danish compliance with EU obligations is high when it comes to formal transposition 
and official scoreboards, the sufficiency of implementation becomes contestable and 
deficits identifiable regarding practical application. De facto compliance depends on 
external checks and balances with administrative autonomy and the ability to 
scrutinize how the civil service interprets and acts upon its EU obligations.       
 
Introduction  
European integration has introduced new and gradually intensified demands to the 
whole spectrum of public administration. Previous research has shown that almost all 
policy areas are affected by EU regulation, albeit to varying degrees (Blom-Hansen 
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and Grønnegaard Christensen 2003). The national executive – and hence the 
administration - is involved in all parts of the EU policy cycle (Kassim 2003). 
National civil servants give expert advice when policies are drafted. They represent 
one decision-maker out of 27 when policies are adopted. In the final stages of the 
policy cycle, they implement decisions and respond when national compliance is 
evaluated. In fulfilling these responsibilities, the national administration plays a key 
role. The public administration constitutes a key actor concerning all parts of EU 
affairs, as it delivers expert advice, decides under flexible mandates and implements 
our EU obligations.   
 
This chapter examines how the Danish public administration responds to the 
European Union (EU). First, it does so first on a more general account of the role 
played in the EU policy cycle, but subsequently narrows the focus down to consider 
the role played when EU policies are implemented. Secondly, it examines 
implementation of EU obligations within two policy areas; healthcare and 
environment. The two policy areas examined have been selected because the Danish 
engagement in supranational regulation has traditionally differed. Denmark has 
traditionally had strong reservations against EU intervention in welfare policies such 
as health care (Martinsen 2005b), but has on the other hand acted proactively when it 
comes to environmental regulation and been seen as a ‘green leader’ (Börzel 2000; 
Liefferink & Andersen 1998).  
 
The analysis finds that for both policy areas, the administrative autonomy to 
implement has been considerable, but depends on the political, judicial and societal 
checks and balances that the executive encounters when transposing EU obligation 
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into national acts and practices. Furthermore, the analysis substantiates that whereas 
Danish compliance with EU obligations is high when it comes to formal transposition 
and official scoreboards, the sufficiency of implementation becomes contestable and 
deficits identifiable regarding practical application. De facto compliance depends on 
external checks and balances with administrative autonomy as well as the ability of 
societal actors and institutions to scrutinize how the civil service interprets and acts 
upon its EU obligations.       
 
The Public Administration and EU Governance  
The national public administration is omnipresent in the EU policy cycle. National 
civil servants advice and act as experts when new initiatives are taken by the 
Commission. They are key actors in the Council’s decision-making process, 
representing their member state in the working groups, in COREPER and sometimes 
representing their minister at Council meetings. When EU directives, regulations or 
case-law by the European Court of Justice are implemented back home, national 
bureaucrats continue to be key actors. In addition, national civil servants are 
participating in the Commission’s commitology committees. In sum, the national 
public administrators take part in all stages of the continuous policy-making process 
of the EU. There are thus good reasons to ‘rediscover bureaucracy’ in EU studies 
(Olsen 2005) or join in on the ‘public administration turn in integration research’ 
(Trondal 2007).  
 
The many arenas of national administrative participation in EU governance mean that 
to view the national and European administrative orders as separate, misguides our 
understanding of the degree of bureaucratic Europeanization. Whereas there may be 
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no structural convergence between national administrative polities in EU 27 (Kassim 
et. al. 2000; Trondal 2007), tasks, policies and responsibilities between the national 
and the EU administration are interwoven indeed. In order to grasp how the EU and 
the national executive intersect, it may be useful to distinguish between the Brussels 
segment and what happens when ‘Europe hits home’ (Börzel and Risse 2000), i.e. 
when national administrators are to implement and assure compliance with EU 
obligations. That is the distinction between the ‘upload’ and the ‘download’ of EU 
policies (See Miles and Wivel 2011, Introduction to this volume).  
 
Bureaucratic segmentation in Brussels  
The many committees of EU governance integrate national civil servants and the EU 
core executive, i.e. the European Commission (Egeberg et al. 2003). The committees 
are steady and active features of EU governance at all stages of EU policymaking. 
Danish civil servants are part of a Brussels segment of multi-level administration, 
where they enter the European capital as representatives of national points of view, 
but met, interact, argue, learn, adapt and socialize with their European counterparts 
(Trondal 2007, p. 964). Egeberg et al. find that such interaction evokes multiple 
preferences, roles and identities, instead of either clear-cut national or supranational 
ones (Egeberg et al. 2003, p. 30). In their study, they find that the institutional 
autonomy varies across committees. Civil servants act more as representatives from 
back home in the Council’s working groups and the Comitology committees than 
when participating in the Commission’s expert committees.1 However, all committees 
produce multiple loyalties for the invited actors and are constitutive parts of the 
                                                 
1
 This finding contrasts (in part, at least) the earlier one by Jorges and Neyer, where participation in the 
Commission’s Comitology committees were found to make national civil servants functional 
representatives of a Europeanized administration, where roles and perceptions transfer from the 
national to the supranational level (Joerges and Neyer 1997).    
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emerging multi-level administration, located in Brussels but where Europeanised 
views, problem-solving understanding and loyalities are brought back home on return 
(Egeberg et al. 2003, p. 30). Thus EU committees are indeed sites where individual 
civil servants are Europeanized.  
 
Denmark’s membership of the European Community in 1973 meant that the public 
administration was confronted with a demand to adapt of a scale not seen before 
(Grønnegård Christensen 2003, p. 63). Since then EU obligation has only grown – in 
scope and depth. However, contrary to the ‘hollowing out of the state’ thesis (Rhodes 
1997), this development does not seem to have disempowered the Danish executive. 
Instead a new EU related bureaucratic order has come into place (Olsen 2007). 
Instead, it is found that over time membership of the European Community and 
increased integration has extended the role and power of the Danish government and 
the Danish central administration (Pedersen et. al. 2002). Part of the explanation is 
that EU policies often have a rather technical content which may prevent substantial 
intervention from a large set of political and societal actors. EU policies tend to 
appear complex, detailed and rather technical which invite for more expert 
participation and deliberation among experts (Martinsen and Beck Jørgensen 2010). 
Danish membership have produced more administrative tasks, and the Danish public 
administration have had more resources transferred to it as a result hereof 
(Grønnegard Christensen 2003, p. 58). Furthermore, Danish EU administration is 
found to be rather centralized and coordinated (Nedergaard 2005, pp. 380-382). This 
points to that the Danish central administration constitutes a powerful actor for 
Denmark’s participation in the daily EU policy process – both in formal and informal 
channels. It, however, participates in a ‘multiple institutional embeddedness’ with 
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varying degrees of institutional autonomy (Egeberg et al. 2003), which makes 
compromised and shared policy-making the operating dynamic of the bureaucratic 
segmentation in Brussels. In this way, administrative autonomy is both considerable 
and compromised. Administrative autonomy constitutes a prerequisite for both 
influencing EU policies and the way this influence is carried out (Miles and Wivel 
2011, Introduction to this volume).     
 
Implementation of EU policies and compliance 
According to Bardach (1977) implementation is ‘the continuation of politics by other 
means’ and the study of implementation thus addresses who controls the allocation of 
resources after a policy has been decided. EU implementation concerns the 
effectuation of EU decision and how such decisions are transcended into outputs and 
outcomes.  The implementation of Community law and policies has been interpreted 
as a potential second stronghold of national control, where national actors may 
attempt to ‘claw back’ what they may have lost during the European decision-making 
process (From and Stava 1993; Mény et al. 1996: 7). According to article 4 (ex. art. 
10) of the Lisbon Treaty, member states are responsible for the implementation of EU 
policies. The post-legislative phase of policy-making may thus be where member 
states regain, or retain, control over the impact of policy and where multiple 
institutional embeddedness is replaced by more unitary, hierarchical administrative 
structures. The first and eventually most decisive actors in the implementation phase 
of EU policies are the government and the national civil servants.  
 
From classic implementation theory, we know that there are ‘decision points’ that are 
critical to the impact and control of policies in the implementation process. A 
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‘decision point’ arises when the consent of actors must be obtained in order to 
proceed with (further) implementation and may hinder efficient and/or successful 
implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973: xxiv). In Europeanization theory, 
‘decision points’ are conceived as ‘veto points’ or positions. Veto points arise at 
various stages in the policy-making process where agreement is required for policy 
change to take place (Haverland 2000: 85). Whereas the number and composition of 
veto-players in EU implementation vary from process to process, the public 
administration has the recurrent role as veto player, proposing to the minister how the 
EU act shall be formally transposed and practically applied (Bursens 2002).   
 
Also regarding implementation, administrative autonomy varies and thus the 
independent influence that the administration may exert on implementation. First of 
all, the national bureaucracy is not a single united actor (Beck Jørgensen 2003), but 
likely to have heterogeneous preferences on correct and sufficient implementation. 
Secondly, the degree to which a policy area is politicized or remains rather technical 
affect administrative autonomy, as the politicized area is likely to be closer supervised 
by the government, the parliament and societal actors. Finally, Administrative 
autonomy is likely to be reduced when regulating policy areas with strong and vested 
societal interests. By and large, the degree of administrative autonomy will depend on 
checks and balances from other institutions and actors.  
 
EU acts will specify the date when the supranational decisions have to be 
implemented. However, this is far from the end of sufficient compliance. 
Subsequently a second round of the post-legislative phase may set off, in which de 
facto compliance may be questioned and examined. During this process, the European 
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Commission and the European Court of Justice may play a key role in ‘pushing’ full 
implementation of policy through identifying and monitoring restrictive application or 
non-compliance by the national government (Börzel 2000; Tallberg 2003). National 
stakeholders, including citizens and interest groups, may be their allies, pointing out 
an implementation deficit and thus ‘pulling’ the impact of EU regulation. While in the 
short to medium run national governments and bureaucracies exert a dominant 
influence over implementation, the combination of supranational mechanisms of 
enforcement and decentralized management mechanisms are decisive to ensure 
compliance in the longer run (Tallberg 2002). The combination of supranational 
enforcement and decentral management mechanisms have been argued to ensure 
considerable efficient EU implementation:  
 
”This twinning of cooperative and coercive instruments in a ”management-enforcement ladder” makes 
the EU exceedingly effective in combating detected violations, thereby reducing non-compliance to a 
temporal phenomenon” (Tallberg 2002, p. 610). 
  
Although non-compliance may be temporal, its occurrence is a continuous challenge 
to the EU system and its output legitimacy. Börzel et al. find that powerful member 
states are the most likely non-compliers with European law whereas small member 
states with efficient bureaucracies are best compliers (Börzel et. al. 2010). The 
explanation is found to be that those smaller member states lack the political power to 
resist compliance pressure from the EU. They don’t have sufficient political resources 
to confront the Commission with what contradict domestic institutional legacies or 
national interests. Instead they generally chose to obey. Member states’ political 
power and government/administrative capacity are thus found to be decisive 
explanatory factors to compliance patterns (Börzel et al 2010). Political power is 
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constituted by economic size and EU voting power (Börzel et al. 2010, p. 13), 
whereas government and administrative capacity consist of resources and the 
bureaucracy’s ability to mobilize and channel resources into compliance (Börzel et. 
al. 2010, p. 7 & p. 14). If resources are dispersed among many public agencies and 
over different levels of government, the bureaucracy is likely to have difficulties in 
mobilizing and channeling such resources into compliance.  
 
Figure 1 below demonstrates that Denmark belongs to those member states which 
have least reported violations of EU law and equally least infringement procedures 
from the Commission. In 2008, it had 38 formal notices of eventual non-compliance 
referred to it by the Commission, but it had no referrals to the Court. By means of 
infringement procedures referred to the Court under article 258 of the Lisbon Treaty, 
Denmark stands out as a best complier which according to Börzel et al. is explained 
by relatively low political power, but high administrative capacity (Börzel et. al. 2010, 
p. 20).   
 
Figure 13.1: Infringement procedures. Formal notice and referral to the court 
2008.
2
    
                                                 
2
 Commission Staff Working Document. Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission  
26
th
 Annual Reprot on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2008). See 
http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/docs/docs_infringements/annual_report_26/en_sec_statannex_vol1
clean.pdf  
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Also when we look at Denmark in separate and examine formal notices, reasoned 
opinions and referrals to the Court, Denmark generally comply before an infringement 
procedure is taken to the Court. Whereas Denmark has a considerable number of 
formal notices and therefore infringement procedures initiated against it, it appears to 
comply before a matter ends up in Court as figure 2 demonstrates below. 
 
Figure 13.2: Infringement procedures against Denmark 2004-2008. Formal 
notice, reasoned opinion and referral to the court
3
    
 
                                                 
3
 Commission Staff Working Document. Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission  
26
th
 Annual Reprot on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2008). See 
http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/docs/docs_infringements/annual_report_26/en_sec_statannex_vol1
clean.pdf  
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Infringement procedures are, however, unlikely to be a sufficient measure of member 
states compliance and only to mirror the tip of the iceberg (Falkner et. al. 2005). 
Underneath that tip we are likely to find many more violations of EU law that the 
Commission does not discover or is informed about.  
 
Implementing EU decisions in Denmark 
In general Denmark enjoys the reputation as a best complier. In the study of Falkner 
et. al. in which the authors have investigated implementation of a set of labour market 
directives in EU 15, Denmark is found to belong to a ‘world of law observance’ 
(Falkner et. al. 2005). Member states within this typology are guided by a compliance 
culture, according to which the goal to comply with EU obligation typically overrides 
domestic interests. Apart from Denmark also Sweden and Finland belong to this 
world of compliance. Two other worlds exist; a ‘world of domestic politics’ and a 
‘world of neglect’. Within the former, obeying EU rules are at best one objective 
among others and within the latter compliance is no goal in itself (Falkner et al. 2005, 
pp. 321-324).
4
 The Falkner typology suggests that the Danish public administration 
has strongly internalized a norm or a culture, determining implementation behavior 
                                                 
4
 Germany, Austria, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain belong to the ’world of domestic 
politics’ whereas Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Luxembourg and France belong to the ’world of 
neglect’ (Falkner et. al 2005, pp. 330-340).   
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and that – driven by this normative logic – Denmark generally implements 
irreproachably.  
 
Also earlier findings suggest high compliance standards in Denmark. Denmark may 
be highly EU-skeptic (Börzel et. al. 2010), however still behaving as the teacher’s pet 
when it comes to the implementation record.  
“As a matter of policy, if a threatening in-court battle is unlikely to be won, the government seems to 
prefer to settle it by an out-of-court compromise. This will often be followed by pertinent new 
legislation being issued or other sorts of legal enactments which brings Denmark impeccably in line 
with its obligations” (Rasmussen 1988, p. 97).    
 
However, we argue that it is important to distinguish between formal transposition 
and practical application (Bursens 2002). Existing studies as well as statistics 
comparing member states’ implementation record tend to concentrate on the formal 
transposition stage. That is the stage between an EU act is adopted and until the 
implementation date set out in that act, where the national executive informs the 
Commission on its implementation measures. Formal transposition is thus a stage 
where the executive’s means of implementation are least contested as they tend to be 
defined by and for the government and central administration. The sufficiency of 
formal transposition has not yet been tried out in practice.  
 
Formal transposition; when administrative autonomy rules 
It is important here to emphasize that formal transposition in Denmark is mainly a 
governmental and administrative act which tend not to involve any direct 
parliamentary control. First of all, this means that administrative transposition is not 
contested and secondly, it may in part explain why Danish implementation stands out 
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as highly efficient. As legal adviser to the Danish government Karsten Hagel-
Sørensen wrote; 
“When Denmark not without reason boast about its very high transposition rate of [EU] rules, an 
important causal mechanism is that transposition to a large extent can be carried out administratively, 
whereas you in other countries as for example Italy traditionally have far stronger constitutional limits 
on delegation from the legislative power to the administration” (Hagel-Sørensen (1994), p. 115, 
author’s translation).  
        
In general, EU directives continue to be transposed by means of executive order. This 
implies that the minister and his/her administration are responsible for the 
implementation but the Danish Parliament is not involved as legislative power. The 
parliament becomes involved when an act is transposed by means of a law, debated 
and processed in the parliament (Blom-Hansen and Grønnegård Christensen 2003, pp. 
72-73). The means of transposition are demonstrated by the study of Blom-Hansen 
and Grønnegård Christensen within the long-time span 1973-2003 (2003).  
 
Table 13.1: Transposition form of EU directives, the year adopted by Danish 
rule, in percent (Blom-Hansen and Grønnegård Christensen 2003, p. 71):  
 Law Executive 
order 
Circular N=100 
percent 
1973 and 
earlier 
23 77 1 137 
1974-1983 19 74 7 309 
1984-1993 25 72 4 867 
1994-2003 28 70 2 2244 
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When implementation takes place in a largely secluded administrative space without 
systematic checks and balances, the administration’s discretionary power and the 
power to define are likely to become considerable. Thus Kallestrup finds that the 
maneuverable scope for the minister and the civil servant acting on his/her behalf has 
not diminished as a result of EU integration, but continues to be extensive (Kallestrup 
2005; 2008). Until national implementation is eventually questioned by supranational 
or non-governmental national institutions and actors, such extensive maneuverable 
scope remains intact. In most matters, EU implementation thus remains within the 
exclusive portfolio of the Danish civil service.  
 
Studies of implementation beyond formal transposition may, however, point out a 
different picture, questioning the Danish reputation as best complier.  
 
Implementing EU healthcare rights 
Between 1998 and 2010, the European Court of Justice laid down that health care is a 
service within the meaning of the Treaty, which shall in principle circulate freely 
(Martinsen 2005; 2009). In its ongoing case-law interpretations, the judiciary has laid 
down that the free movement principles apply to all health care services independent 
of how that health care service is financed or which health care system provides it. 
Jurisprudence has clarified that under certain conditions national restrictions to cross 
border health care are justified, but here the Court distinguishes between non-hospital 
care and hospital care. Free movement applies without restrictions to non-hospital 
care, essentially meaning any form of out-patient care/ambulatory care that can be 
taken care of without hospitalisation, i.e. without spending at least 24 hours in 
hospital. Regarding hospital care, member states may make access to treatment in 
15 
 
another member state subject to certain conditions. The Court finds it justifiable that 
member states make the right to treatment subject to first having that right authorised 
by the competent healthcare institution. But the Court also sets out that the national 
authority is obliged to issue the authorisation if the same treatment cannot be provided 
without undue delay back home and the decision whether to authorise or not has to be 
based on international medical science and not purely national considerations.  
 
The judicial policymaking process between 1998-2010 is characterised by bits and 
pieces. Judicial interpretation departs from considering very specific healthcare goods 
and services with very specific conditions for its provision to gradually consider 
healthcare in more general terms. Concerning implementation, the Danish civil 
service has had a considerable scope to re-interpret, formulate and communicate how 
the wording of Court impacts on Danish healthcare policy (Martinsen and Vrangbæk 
2008). Below, the scope of administrative autonomy will be analyzed. That is the 
scope to re-interpret and lay down a national understanding of what constitutes a 
service within the meaning of the Treaty.    
 
The Danish government was one of the first governments to react to the early rulings 
of 1998. The government chose to set up an inter-ministerial working group of expert 
civil servants, commissioned to analyse the implications of the judgments for Danish 
health policy. The working group acknowledged that the cases had implications for 
healthcare systems other than that of Luxembourg and were not limited to glasses and 
dental treatment. The Danish report, however, contained a narrow definition of what 
constitutes a ‘service’, which remained the Danish re-definition of ‘service’ although 
later contradicted by new case law of the Court. To be a service according to the 
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meaning of Treaty Article 50, the Danish civil service argued that there needs to be an 
element of private pay and profit involved:  
 
“It is the view of the working group that if, on the other hand, the treatment had been taken care of by 
the public hospital sector, the Treaty’s Article 49 would not have applied. The reason is that Article 50 
defines services as services normally carried out in return for remuneration [...]Characteristic for a 
service is thus that a service provider offers a service in return for remuneration” (Danish Report on the 
Decker/Kohll rulings 1999, p. 23. Emphasis added). 
 
With the Danish way of narrowing down the definition of ‘service’, it could keep the 
large majority of Danish healthcare services outside the definition, since they are 
provided as benefits in kind, free of charge and thus with no direct remuneration. The 
early jurisprudence by the Court resulted in a smaller amendment of Danish 
healthcare policy, implemented by executive order
5
, and according to which persons 
insured under Group 2 could have medical treatment from a general practioner as well 
as a specialist doctor in another member state, whereas persons insured under Group 1 
could purchase dental assistance, physiotherapy, and chiropractic treatments with 
subsequent fixed-price reimbursement from the relevant Danish institutions. 
 
When Denmark submitted its opinion in the 2001 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms case 
before the European Court of Justice, it replicated its narrow definition of ‘service’, 
and argued that one precondition for a service to be a service within the meaning of 
the Treaty was that there must be an element of private pay and that the service must 
be provided with a view to making a profit (Report for the Hearing, pp. 76-78 in Case 
C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, 2001). Although the Court overruled the 
                                                 
5
 The policy reform entered into force by executive order, BEK no. 536 of 15 June 2000 
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Danish definition in the sense that it overruled a ‘service’ requires an element of 
private pay and one of profit, Denmark did not change its point of view and did not 
extend the scope of outpatient treatment that could be provided in another member 
state.  
 
However, an internal departmental note from 2004
6
 clearly points out that the 
sufficiency of Danish implementation was disputed inside the Department of Health. 
Although the public administration externally agreed in consensus, it less acted as a 
unitary actor internally. The note sat out explicitly that the Danish understanding of a 
service within the meaning of the Treaty could no longer be sustained, and that in the 
light of the recent case-law
7
 the Danish implementation of EU law was too narrow. 
The Minister, at that time Lars Løkke Rasmussen, had thus been informed by his 
bureaucracy, but nevertheless no change occurred externally. In later answers to 
parliamentary questions, the narrow definition of ‘service’ was restated (see answers 
to parliamentary questions no. 4965, 4967 and 4969, 17 May 2006).  
 
Internal dispute and critique inside the civil service did not suffice as pressure to 
adapt. Instead practical application to EU law required external checks and balances 
outside the departmental corridors. In 2003, a case before the Danish National Social 
Appeals Board, Ankestyrelsen, commenced. One of the Danish municipalities had 
refused to reimburse a patient with group 1 healthcare insurance in Denmark his cost 
for provided outpatient/ambulatory care in Germany. In the first case before the 
                                                 
6
 Internal unofficial departemental note from the Ministry of Interior and Health, 22. March 2004.  
 
7
 I.e. the cases C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, 2001 and C-372/99 Müller-Fauré and van Riet, 
2003. 
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Social Appeals Board
8
, the Board supported the refusal, reasoning that the cost of care 
provided by a specialist doctor in Germany could not be reimbursed since a service 
within the meaning of the Treaty required an element of private pay and one of profit. 
The Board thus leaned onto the definition of the Ministry, without considering it any 
further. The patient, however, complained to the Danish ombudsmand. The 
Ombudsmand entered the case, and exchanged viewpoints with both the Ministry and 
the Social Appeals Board. Against this background, the Board decided to take the 
case up again. This resulted in a revised decision 3 years later
9
, in which the Social 
Appeals Board found that specialist treatment for insured persons under group 1 
constitutes a service within the meaning of the Treaty. It thus contradicted the 
maintained definition of the Ministry of Health, reasoning that the European Court of 
Justice had a broader view on what defines as a EU related service than what has been 
the Danish re-definition from 2000 an onwards.  
 
The new statement by the Board did, however, not lead to the Ministry reconsidering 
its implementation practice. In May 2007, the Danish ombudsmand proceeded with 
his inquiries and questioned the Ministry why it had not changed its executive order 
of June 2000 to include a broader view on access to healthcare services in another EU 
member state. The ombudsmand also reminded the Ministry that the National Social 
Appeals Board ranked as the highest national administrative instance in interpreting 
and laying down the definition of service within the meaning of the Treaty. The 
Ministry finally responded and changed the executive order as of 1 December 2008
10
 
to also cover specialist treatment in another member state for group 1 insured in 
Denmark.  
                                                 
8
 Case before the National Social Appeals Board, 31 October 2003.  
9
 Case before the National Social Appeals Board, 29 September 2006, SM S-2-06.  
10
 The policy reform entered into force by executive order, BEK no. 1098 19 November 2008.   
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With a time lag of more than 8 years, Danish application in law and practice stands 
out as anything but best compliance. Instead it appears to be self-reliant, defensive 
and for a considerable time period rather immune to internal and external criticism. It 
takes institutionalised checks and balances with authorised mandates to inquire into 
administrative practices to rectify the implementation balance which lasted for almost 
a decade. In this case, the Danish ombudsmand became the turning point.  
 
Implementation of EU environmental regulation 
Analysing practical application, implementation deficit appears more common than 
general statistics on formal transposition would lead us to believe. When it comes to 
EU environmental regulation, Denmark has had the self-perception to be among the 
leading member states. The role as leader or best practice has often been stated by the 
Danish Ministry of the Environment; 
“In many years, Denmark has had a high environmental profile in the EU (…) therefore Denmark has 
pressed for high environmental standards and been very active, when it comes to the environment in 
EU” (Miljøstyrelsen [The Environmental Protection Agency] “Fælles miljø, fælles ansvar – Danmark 
og EU” (2002), p. 20) 
 
However, concerning implementation the Danish role is more disputable. In the 
following, practical application will be examined concerning the EU directive on the 
conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, also known as the 
habitats directive.
11
 According to the Directive, EU member states are to point out 
areas where wild flora and fauna can be conserved in order to preserve biodiversity.  
                                                 
11
 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild 
fauna and flora. 
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In Denmark, the directive was implemented by executive order in 1998, where the 
Ministry pointed out 194 natural habitats.
12
 This formal transposition resulted in 
various very critical evaluations. The Danish Nature Council, ‘Naturrådet’, found the 
implementation severely insufficient, not sufficiently setting out positive protection 
by means of conservation planning and not containing rules regarding general 
protection within appointed habitats. The implementation deficit implied that 
protection of nature even within the assigned habitats will not necessarily be favoured 
if other activities (as for example enterprises, construction or agriculture) threatens 
biodiversity or general conservation of the areas (Pagh 2001).   
 
The Ministry of Environment initiated its own evaluation and requested the Legal 
Adviser to the Danish Government, Kammeradvokaten, to prepare a judicial report on 
the implementation. The report came out summer 2002 and was highly critical. It 
found Danish implementation to be insufficient, among other aspects in the light of 
the dynamic development of EU law.
13
 
“But it has to be assumed that it [the Directive] not only concerns an obligation to establish areas, but 
also to ensure effective protection of those areas. In this regard the member states are obliged to ensure 
that considerable deteriorations of the areas or disturbances of the species, they are appointed to 
conserve, are avoided” (Kammeradvokaten [The legal adviser to the Danish government], 2002, p. 21. 
Author’s translation).   
 
Although considerable implementation deficits were pinpointed by the adviser, the 
Ministry decided not to inform the Danish Parliament on the critical report. 
                                                 
12
 Executive order, BEK 782 by 1 November 1998.  
 
13
 Referring to the case-law of the European Court of Justice, see case C-103/00 Commission v. 
Greece, 30 January 2002 and case C-117/00 Commission v. Ireland, 13. June 2002.   
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Information on the report, however, leaked and in December 2002, a member of the 
socialist party questioned the Minister if he had not had a judicial assessment of the 
Danish implementation of EU environment rules (Berlingske Tidende 2002). 
Meanwhile, the Danish Forest and Nature Agency under the Ministry of Environment 
had requested the Consultancy firm, Rambøll, to analyse what the implementation of 
the habitats directive and the directive on the conservation of wild birds
14
 would cost. 
The estimated amount was received by shock - and then silence. It was estimated that 
the implementation would cost between 1.7 and 2.6 billion Danish crones, i.e. 344-
347 million Euros, between 2003 and 2012 (Parliamentary question to the Danish 
Minister of Environment, S. 5439, 4 April 2004). The Danish Forest and Nature 
Agency received the report by July 2002, but decided not to inform the Commission, 
nor the Danish Parliament on the estimated costs until December 2002. It was later 
held that the government had decided to keep silent until after the yearly negotiations 
on the national budget (Berlingske Tidende 2002).       
 
Also the national NGOs intervened considerably in the practical application of the 
habitats directive. They came to constitute important national agencies that discovered 
and informed the European Commission on implementation deficits. In 2003, the 
Danish Ornithological Society, Dansk Ornitologisk Forening, complained to the 
Commission on what they found to be insufficient protection of the important bird 
area in Southern Jutland ‘Tøndermarsken’ (Andersen and Iversen 2006). Also the 
Danish Society for Nature Conversation, Danmarks Naturfredningsforening, sent 
complaints (Andersen and Iversen 2006, pp. 91-92). These complaints contributed to 
                                                 
14
 Council Directive 79/409 of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds. 
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the Commission sending a formal notice
15
 to the Danish government in 2003 (The 
Foreign Ministry 2007; Andersen and Iversen 2006, p. 81). Against this background, 
the Danish Ministry of the Environment chose to appoint supplementing habitats as of 
1. July 2003.
16
 All in all supplementing habitats were pointed out 5 times, latest in 
2009. The Commission is, however, still not satisfied with the implementation of the 
Directive and continues to examine the Danish case (Udenrigsministeriet [The 
Foreign Ministry] 2009; Ritzaus Bureau 2010; Flensborg Avis 2010).  
 
In the case of environment, Danish implementation has not gone smoothly and 
Denmark has not proven to be a best complier when it comes to practical application. 
Instead the public administration has interpreted its EU obligations much too limited. 
In the medium run, between the formal transposition of the Directive in 1998 and till 
approximately 2002, implementation remained an uncontested governmental matter, 
administered by the civil service. In this period administrative autonomy was high. 
However, as a result of external evaluations implementation was brought under 
intensified scrutiny and the government gradually forced to adapt more in line with its 
EU obligations. This substantiates that compliance estimated by means of practical 
application is a much more inefficient and complicated process than formal 
transposition and best compliance scoreboards lead us to believe. To ensure practical 
application demands external checks and balances which recurrently question and 
control the de facto sufficiency of national implementation. In the case of 
                                                 
15
 The formal notice questioned the Danish implementation of art. 6. 2-4 of the habitats directive (The 
Foreign Ministry 2007, p. 32). 
  
16
 See 
http://www.blst.dk/NATUREN/Natura2000plan/Natura2000omraader/Habitat/Udpegningsprocessen/ 
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environmental regulation, the Danish parliament and NGOs played such key role, 
reducing the administrative autonomy of the Danish executive. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The national public administration stands out as omnipresent in the EU policy cycle, 
having a significant say from the initiation to the evaluation of supranational 
decisions. The bureaucracy proves to be key actor at all stages and there are good 
reason to ‘rediscover bureaucracy’ (Olsen 2005) in the EU institutional order.  
 
Whereas the national civil servant may fly into Brussels as representative of national 
points of view, s/he adapts and socializes with his/her European counterparts. 
Identities and preferences in the bureaucratic segment in Brussels thus become 
overlapping and multiple. This has a significant impact on administrative autonomy 
and influence. On the one hand, administrative autonomy is considerable as civil 
servants are the continuous actors in EU policy-making. EU integration has not 
disempowered the bureaucracy, but quite on the contrary made it the irreplaceable 
actor in the EU related bureaucratic order. On the other hand, administrative 
autonomy is compromised as the national civil servant participates in a multiple 
institutional embeddedness, and the more Europeanized s/he becomes, the more 
obliged to think and act on behalf of Europe – and take that view with him/her back 
home.  
 
Implementation is different and poses different demands on bureaucratic behaviour. 
Formal transposition is one thing. Here administrative autonomy seems to rule. 
Danish implementation is mainly made by means of executive orders. This implies 
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that the decision on how to comply is largely taken in a secluded administrative space. 
Compliance scoreboards continue to portray Denmark as best complier, and as long as 
Denmark continues to do so well there is no immediate reason for the Commission to 
question formal transposition. However, the reputation as best complier and obedient 
European may only picture Danish compliance half way through.  
 
As the two case studies analysed in this chapter demonstrate, practical application is 
where implementation becomes more muddy business – also in Denmark. Practical 
application suggests that the public administration may far from always prioritise 
compliance over domestic interests. The efficient bureaucracies of small member 
states (Börzel et al. 2010) may not necessarily assure high compliance. Their 
bureaucratic ethos is far from neutral, but actually strive to preserve national 
autonomy, more loyal to the preferences of their ministers and the legacies of their 
national institutions than to EU obligations. The two case studies also substantiate that 
in practical application external checks and balances become essential. In this stage of 
EU policy-making, sufficient implementation comes to depend on the extent to which 
institutionalised checks and balances and societal actors are oriented towards the EU 
system as well as the extent to which they are capable and willing to evaluate national 
practices in the light of EU law and policies. Their part taking in a multiple 
institutional embeddedness becomes as essential when it comes to effectuating 
supranational decisions as it was to policy initiation and decision-making.  
 
Analysing the role of the public administration and the implementation process 
provides insights on at least two of the dimensions raised in the introduction to this 
volume (Miles and Wivel 2011). Administrative autonomy varies across policy areas 
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and stages in the policy cycle. As a result hereof the independent influence that the 
civil servants may exert on how and to which degree Europe is effectuated varies too. 
When it comes to the two cases examined in this chapter, high administrative 
autonomy equals high influence to the Danish civil service on the reach of Europe 
into Danish society and concrete EU rights. Administrative autonomy and influence 
are, however, reduced the more other institutions and actors step in as mechanisms of 
checks and balances. The extent of policy change and the impact of Europe thus seem 
to depend not only on administrative power and capacity, but also on the engagement 
of the national legislature and societal actors. This proves that the EU political system 
and its impact has matured to such a degree that the same mechanisms are at play as 
when we consider domestic political systems and their policy cycles.   
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